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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the admissible evidence before the 
court below was sufficient to establish genuine issues 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment 
as a matter of law. 
2. Whether Conder was permitted under Utah 
law to affirm an employment contract upon learning of 
the fraud and misrepresentation which induced him to enter 
into said contract, and pursue his remedy in damages. 
3. Whether Conder was required to rescind said 
contract in order to mitigate his damages. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature. This appeal relates to a cause of action 
for damages resulting from fraud and misrepresentation 
in the inducement of an employment contract between Conder 
and the respondents. 
Course and disposition in court below. Conder 
filed his Complaint on August 27, 1982, alleging five 
causes of action. On July 27, 1984, the court below heard 
a motion for summary judgment filed by A.L. Williams and 
MILICO and, as a result, the first cause of action, alleging 
fraud and misrepresentation, was dismissed by partial 
summary judgment entered September 5, 1984. The motion 
was denied as to three causes of action which alleged 
wrongful termination and breach of contract. This Court 
subsequently denied the petition of A.L. Williams and 
MILICO for an interlocutory appeal on those issues, (Case 
No. 20262), and they are not a part of this Appeal. The 
remaining cause of action had been abandoned previously. 
The court below thereafter denied Conder's motion 
to amend the partial summary judgment and entered its 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, on October 11, 1984. 
On November 27, 1984, this Court denied respond-
ents' motion for summary disposition of this case. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought in the court below because 
of what Conder claims were fraudulent statements made 
by agents of A.L. Williams and MILICO, misrepresenting 
to him the nature of their business and the authority 
they had to do business and provide services in the State 
of Utah. Relying upon such statements and misrepresenta-
tions, Conder was induced to go to work as an agent of 
MILICO, working in the A.L. Williams sales organization. 
By doing so he claims to have sustained compensable damages. 
MILICO is a Massachusetts insurance corporation 
doing business in Utah although not qualified as a foreign 
corporation pursuant to Title 16, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. (R102 H3) It received a Certificate of Authority 
to sell insurance from the predecessor of the State of 
Utah Department of Insurance on March 1, 1964. (R102 ^4) 
A.L. Williams is a Georgia corporation which 
acts as the nationwide marketing organization for MILICO 
in Utah (R14-16 1Hf3,6) but is not qualified under Title 
16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. (R91 *$3) It was licensed 
by the Insurance Department on March 19, 1982, under the 
name A.L. Williams Insurance Services, Inc. (R91 ^4) 
This licensure did not occur until after the events com-
plained of in the Complaint. (R3 1f9) 
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Conder was first introduced to A.L. Williams 
and iMILICO in the early part of 1980 by a friend who had 
attended an opportunity meeting conducted by A.L. Williams' 
representatives. Although Conder was gainfully employed 
at the time, he was looking for opportunities to improve 
himself financially. Consequently, he had several conversa-
tions with various representatives of A.L. Williams and 
MILICO and met with them at their opportunity meetings 
to learn more of the companies and the opportunities open 
to him to pursue a career with them. During these conver-
sations and meetings, Conder was told by sales representa-
tives, sales supervisors and regional yi-cet presidents 
of A.L. Williams that A.L. Williams was a full service 
financial company like E.F. Hutton, Merrill Lynch and 
Dean Witter and that it dealt in insurance, real estate, 
securities, gold, silver and annuities. (R221, 241 [^9, 
511 A3) 
These persons, in referring to A.L. Williams, 
often spoke of "the insurance side of the house," "the 
real estate side of the house," and "the investment side 
of the house." R221, 241 [^9, 511 1f3, 518 [^2, 520 1J2) 
The obvious impression left with recruits was that if 
they came to work with A.L. Williams they would be involved 
in investment counseling and asset management (R511-12 
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11115,8, 518 1J4, 520 1f3) Conder left his former employment 
in reliance upon these representations because he desired 
to get into the business of investment counseling. (R511-
12 1f7) 
In fact, A.L. Williams did nothing but sell 
MILICO insurance. It has never been licensed as a real 
estate broker. (R447 1J3) It has never received compensation 
for buying, selling, leasing or exchanging real estate 
for another, (R448 If 5) nor has it employed, during the 
period in question, anyone as a real estate salesman. 
(R449 U8) 
Furthermore, A.L. Williams has never been licensed 
by the Utah Securities Division as a broker-dealer, invest-
ment advisor or issuer to enable it to have "an investment 
side of the house," (R451 HI 3) nor has it received any 
compensation for any securities-related business. (R452 
1F17) A.L. Williams claims an affiliation with a licensed 
broker-dealer through which its agents may sell securities 
(R451-52 1J15) but that company was not registered as such 
during the period in question. 
Even after Conder signed an agent agreement 
with A.L. Williams and began his initial training in insur-
ance, he was led to believe that training in the field 
of securities would begin later. (R512 1J9) By the time 
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he discovered that A.L. Williams was only a marketing 
organization for MILICO and that it only sold insurance, 
he had severed all ties with his former employers and 
had committed his time and resources to A.L. Williams. 
He continued working with A.L. Wiliams because he had 
no other source of income (R512 1^12,13) 
The foregoing Statement of Facts is based upon 
evidence which was of record when the court below heard 
defendants' motion for summary judgment and includes answers 
to interrogatories, official records and affidavits filed 
in opposition to the said motion. Defendants filed no 
affidavits in support of their motion and their memorandum 
primarily cited selected excerpts from depositions which 
were never published and are not now a part of the record 
on appeal nor were they part of the published record at 
the time of the hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Introduction. Summary judgment is a harsh 
remedy which should only be used when all admissible evi-
dence before the court in the form of pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or affidavits 
show that there are no genuine issues as to any material 
fact and that summary judgment is appropriate as a matter 
of law. 
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2« There are numerous issues of material fact 
which preclude summary judgment in this case. Although 
all the evidence relevant to this case is not yet before 
the court, there is sufficient evidence in the form of 
answers to interrogatories and affidavits to establish 
that the elements of fraud were present in the events 
complained of in this action. Although the record is 
virtually devoid of evidence supporting the position of 
A.L. Williams and MILICO, which position is indicated 
by their Answer to the Complaint, one must assume that 
they concede that there are genuine issues of material 
fact but that they claim, instead, that the facts as alleged 
and so far proved, support a contention that they are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nevertheless, 
Conder believes these issues of fact, must be determined 
by a jury. 
3. The essential elements of fraud were suffi-
ciently alleged in the Complaint and the evidence adduced 
supports said elements. Of the nine elements of fraud 
enumerated in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 
273 (1952), and alleged by Conder, five were unchallenged 
in the case below and are not before this Court. Of the 
remaining four elements, Conder contends that summary 
judgment is also inappropriate as a matter of law. 
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4- The victim of fraud has the option to rescind 
a_ fraudulently induced contract and seek restitution or 
to affirm the contract and sue for damages. The general 
principles of law concerning remedies available to the 
victim of a fraudulently induced contract should be avail-
able to Conder and he should not be required to terminate 
his employment agreement to maintain an action against 
the defendants. Such a requirement denies him the option 
to elect to affirm the agreement and ask for damages, 
5. The doctrine of avoidable conseq uences does 
not require the victim of a fraudulently induced contract 
to rescind the contract upon learning of the fraud. It 
is a misapplication of the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences to require Conder to quit his job and seek employ-
ment elsewhere to mitigate damages caused by the fraud 
of defendants. 
STATEMENT OF LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states 
that summary judgment may be granted: 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, 
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the moving parties should prevail in each of the two areas 
set forth in Rule 56(c), i.e., they must show that (1) 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
(2) they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Such a remedy is harsh in that it prevents a 
party from having his day in court and should be used reluc-
tantly by the courts. This Court has said, in Brandt v. 
Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 353 P.2d 460 (1960) 
that: 
We are cognizant of the desirability of 
permitting litigants to fully present their 
case to the court and that summary judgment 
prevents this. For that reason courts are, 
and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy. 
Although summary judgment may be appropriate 
in some instances, and when thus granted, may spare all 
parties the time, trouble and expense of a trial, such 
a ruling should be made by the court only when clearly 
justified after reviewing the record and the evidence 
and every inference fairly arising therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom such action is 
sought. Frisbee v. K&K Construction Co., 656 P.2d 391 
(Utah 1984); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 
395 P.2d 62 (1964); Brandt, supra; Morris v. Farnsworth 
Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (1953). 
In determining whether there is a genuine issue 
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as to any material fact, the court is permitted an "excur-
sion beyond the pleadings", Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions 
First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980), to determine 
if a motion for summary judgment should be granted. Indeed, 
pleadings alone are insufficient to sustain or defeat 
such a motion. Cf. Golden Oil Co., Inc. v. Exxon Co., 
U.S.A. , 543 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1977); Anderson v. Viking 
Pump Division, Houdaille Industries, Inc., 545 F.2d 1127 
(8th Cir. 1976). 
Even if a motion for summary judgment is based 
upon averments or admissions in answers to interrogatories, 
depositions, admissions on file or affidavits, it still 
may not justify granting summary judgment if such averments 
or admissions would not be admissible as evidence in court. 
It has been held that conclusions and bare contentions, 
Frisbee , supra; hearsay statements and conclusions, A&M 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hunziker, 25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 
700 (1971); conclusionary allegations, Bruce v. Martin-
Marietta Corp. , 544 F2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); hearsay 
and legal conclusions, Doff v. Brunswick Corporation, 
372 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1967); and bare contentions, Massey 
v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980), are insuf-
ficient to justify the granting of a motion for summary 
judgment. Thus, inadmissible evidence cannot be used 
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to support a challenge to a cause of action in a motion 
for summary judgment. 
Furthermore, evidence not properly before the 
court cannot be considered in determining the merits of 
such a motion. In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 
2d 334, 384 P.2d 109 (1963), depositions were taken but 
never published, marked or introduced into evidence nor 
read by the trial court. Although both parties cited 
from the depositions in their briefs before the trial 
court, this Court said on appeal from summary judgment, 
11
. . . we must assume that the testimony contained in the 
deposition was not presented to or considered by the lower 
court." Similar rulings were made in the cases of Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwri-
ters, Inc., 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963), and Rosan-
der v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146 (1962). In 
Rosander, this Court said: 
It deserves mentioning that the plaintiff's 
deposition was taken in this action. Defendant 
in his brief makes reference to this deposition. 
However, the deposition as received by this 
court was still in the sealed envelope of the 
reporter. Under the circumstances we cannot 
consider its contents and must assume that it 
was not considered by the lower court. 
Matters not admitted in evidence before the 
trier of fact will not be considered on appeal. Pilcher 
v. State of Utah Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 
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450 (Utah 1983); Utah Department of Transportation v. 
Fuller, 603 P.2d 814 (Utah 1979); Corbet v. Corbet, 24 
Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). 
In brief summary, a motion for summary judgment 
can only be granted if supported by admissible evidence 
properly before the court. It cannot be granted if only 
supported by pleadings, inadmissible evidence or evidence 
not submitted to the court on a timely basis. 
POINT I 
THERE ARE NUMEROUS ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THIS CASE 
Conder contends that there are numerous and 
significant issues of material fact which were before 
the lower court. Since A.L. Williams and MILICO did 
not support their motion for summary judgment with affida-
vits, and the depositions were not before the court, the 
motion must be supported, if at all, by the pleadings 
themselves, and the averments or admissions in answers 
to interrogatories. Since little effort was made by A.L. 
Williams and MILICO in their memorandum in support of 
their motion for summary judgment to cite such documents, 
it is reasonable to assume that the main thrust of their 
argument was not that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact, but that the facts as they were set forth 
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in the record required judgment for them as a matter of 
law. 
Nevertheless, the following are the issues of 
material fact which Conder believes must be determined 
by a jury if he is to have his rightful day in court. 
(References in parenthesis are to the portions of the 
record where the position of the parties is set forth.) 
1. Whether A.L. Williams was referred to by 
the defendants in this lawsuit as then being a full service 
financial-type organization like E.F. Button, Merrill 
Lynch and Dean Witter. (R3 1fl2; 15 1112; 221; 241; 511 
1f3; 51811112,3; 520 H1f2,3) 
2. Whether A.L. Williams was characterized 
by the said defendants as then dealing in real estate 
and securities as well as securities. (R3 1112; 15 1112; 
221; 241; 511 1[3; 518 1[2; 520 %2) 
3. Whether such references or characterizations 
were relating to presently existing facts or to future 
plans, promises or performances. (3 1fl2; 15 1fl2; 221; 
241; 511 H3; 518 1fU2,3; 520 1f1f2,3) 
4. Whether such representations were false. 
(R3 fl2; 15 H12; 221; 241; 512 1J10; 518 1f6; 520 1J5) 
5. Whether Conder reasonably relied upon such 
representations in acting to change his employment. (R5 
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1f1f2l,22; 16 UU21,22; 2 2 1 ; 2 4 1 ; 511 fl6) 
6, Whether such reliance upon such representa-
tions resulted in damage to Conder. (R5 1f22; 16 ^21,22; 
221; 241; 511 1f 8; 512 1fll) 
7. Whether Conder took all necessary steps 
to mitigate any such damage. (R512 1fl3; 655-56) 
There is nothing in the Partial Summary Judgment 
from which Conder appeals to indicate the reasons for 
its entry. (R526-27) In light of the foregoing enumeration 
of issues remaining to be decided it is evident that the 
trial court could not have reasonably determined that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact as re-
quired by Rule 56(c). 
POINT II 
THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRAUD WERE 
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT 
AND THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED SUPPORTS 
SAID ELEMENTS 
The essential elements of fraud have been enumer-
ated by this Court in Pace v. Parrish, supra, to be: (1) 
that a representation was made; (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; (3)which was false; (4) which 
the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation; (5) for the purpose 
of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the 
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other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
These elements have been alleged in Conder's 
Complaint. (R5 «H21,22) A.L. Williams and MILICO challenged 
only four of them in their motion for summary judgment 
so it can be assumed for the purposes of their motion 
and this appeal, that they concede the remaining five 
elements of fraud were sufficiently pleaded and that the 
evidence might sustain them. Since the five elements 
were not at issue in the court below, they cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 
P.2d 100 (Utah 1983) 
The four elements of fraud, as enumerated in 
Pace, which were at issue below, are (1) the second element 
concerning a "presently existing material factM, (R646-
50); (2) the third element concerning falsity of the repre-
sentations, (R650-51); (3) the sixth element concerning 
the reasonableness of Conder's reliance on the misrepre-
sentations, (R652-55); and (4) the ninth element concerning 
damages, (R655-56). 
The Evidence Demonstrates Defendants r Representa-
tions Related to Presently Existing Material Facts. First, 
Conder's Complaint (R2 1(12) alleges in the present tense 
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that defendants "intentionally misrepresented the A.L. 
Williams company to be a 'full service financial-type 
company. Mf Such a statement cannot be read to imply future 
promises, predictions or conjectures. Furthermore, answers 
to interrogatories, (R221,241) and affidavits (R511, 518, 
520) clearly show that the statements and representations 
in question related to supposedly existing facts and situa-
tions. No affidavits were filed in support of the conten-
tions of A.L. Williams and MILICO, but had there been 
any, they would only have contested the statements referred 
to above, thus creating the issue of material fact which 
would preclude summary judgment. 
The Representations Made To Conder Were False. 
A.L. Williams has never been licensed as a real estate 
broker. (R447 ^3) Since real estate agents must sell 
through a broker, (See U.C.A. 61-2-1, et seq.), it was 
not possible for A.L. Williams to have the "real estate 
side of the house" which it claimed to have. Even if 
MILICO agents happened to have a real estate license, 
they would have had to work through a company other than 
A.L. Williams or MILICO, since neither were licensed as 
brokers. 
Furthermore, A.L. Williams has never been licensed 
as a broker-dealer or issuer. (R451 If 13) Consequently, 
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any person who had a securities license could not have 
represented it as a securities agent. (See U.C.A. 61-
1-1, et seq.) Any person so licensed who was working 
for A.L. Williams or MILICO would have had to use such 
a license, if it was used at all, for someone other than 
A.L. Williams or MILICO. Thus, there was no "securities" 
or "investment" side of the house. 
Again, no affidavits or discovery are of record 
which dispute the above, but if they were, they would 
only create an issue of fact which would make summary 
judgment inappropriate. 
Conder Reasonably Relied Upon the Misrepresenta-
tions of A.L. Williams and MILICO. Although A.L. Williams 
and MILICO do not support their claim with affidavits 
or other admissible evidence in support thereof, they 
cited two cases in their argument below, in an attempt 
to show that Conder did not reasonably rely upon their 
false representations. 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 
423 P.2d 659 (Utah 1967), recognizes a defense to actionable 
fraud which is analogous to contributory negligence in 
other tort actions. This Court said: 
The one who complains of being injured by such 
a false representation cannot heedlessly accept 
as true whatever is told him, but has the duty 
of exercising such degree of care to protect 
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his own interests as would be exercised by an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under 
the circumstances; and if he failed to do so, 
is precluded from holding someone else to account 
for the consequences of his own neglect. 
Jardine was cited in Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. 
Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980), by the defendants in 
that case in an attempt to show that a person is precluded 
from recovering if he is "contributorily negligent." 
However, this Court rejected that argument saying, at 
p. 804, that Jardine "was a case of negligent misrepresenta-
tion. Negligence is a proper defense in a case of negligent 
misrepresentation, but it is not a proper defense in the 
case of an intentional misrepresentation." There is nothing 
in the record to support the proposition that A.L. Williams 
and MILICO were negligent in their misrepresentation and 
that such fraud was not intentional. The Court went on, 
in Berkeley Bank, to say: 
It can hardly be maintained that the general 
moral level of business and other financial 
relationships would be enhanced by a rule of 
law which would allow a person to defend against 
a willful, deliberate fraud by stating, "You 
should not have trusted or believed me" or "Had 
you not been so gullible you would not have 
been [so] deceived. . . . The rules governing 
fraud should foster intercourse based on trust, 
forthrightness and honesty. 
A.L. Williams and MILICO also cited Mikkelson v. Quail 
Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982), in support of 
their claim that Conder did not reasonably rely on their 
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misrepresentations. In that case, a homebuyer sued his 
real estate agent because the house was not as large as 
it had been represented by the agent. In rejecting his 
claim for relief, this Court noted that the homebuyer 
not only had inspected the house, but had loan documents 
in his possession prior to the closing which revealed 
the correct footage. Thus, his reliance on the statements 
of the agent was not reasonable. 
Although the principle of reasonable reliance 
is appropriate and furthers justice in some cases, there 
is nothing in the record which demonstrates that it should 
apply in this case to defeat Conder's claim. Indeed, 
Conder's affidavit, which is the only evidence so introduced 
on this subject, states that "he had confidence in the 
persons who made the above representations and had no 
reason to believe that such representations were false". 
(R511 116) 
Whether Damages Should Be Awarded Is _A Question 
of Fact. Whether Conder is entitled to recover damages 
in this case is, and should be, a question of fact to 
be decided by the jury. Because of the apparent emphasis 
placed upon this issue by the court below in its decision 
to grant summary judgment as to Conder's claim of fraud 
and misrepresentation, it will be treated separately in 
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Point IV of this Statement of Law. 
POINT III 
THE VICTIM OF FRAUD HAS THE OPTION 
TO RESCIND A FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED 
CONTRACT AND SEEK RESTITUTION OR TO 
AFFIRM THE CONTRACT AND SUE FOR DAMAGES 
This issue was raised by the claim of A.L. Williams 
and MILICO that Conder should have terminated his employment 
immediately upon learning that the representations which 
had induced him to go to work for them in the first place 
were fraudulent. The court below seems to have accepted 
that claim as the basis of its granting the summary judg-
ment. (R613-14) 
This position assumes that there are undisputed 
facts in evidence which establish the exact moment when 
Conder came to this realization. There are not. Further-
more, it confuses the selection of a remedy with the amount 
of damages which may be awarded after the remedy is se-
lected. This latter point, the amount of damages, is 
discussed in more detail in Point IV. 
Typically, a person who claims that he has been 
defrauded in a transaction with another person, has two 
alternative courses of action that he can pursue. McCor-
mick, Damages §121, pp. 448-54. He may rescind the agree-
ment by renouncing it to the other party, tender back 
all the consideration he has received, and sue for restora-
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tion of all that he has parted with in the bargain. How-
ever, if the victim of the fraud is unable to tender back 
what he received, or finds it inexpedient to do so, he 
may affirm the agreement by bringing an action which claims 
damages based on the assumption that each party will keep 
what he obtained under the agreement. 
In this case, Conder did find it inexpedient 
to rescind the contract, simply because of the difficulty 
in returning both parties to the situation that they were 
in before the agreement. Neither the court nor the defend-
ants had the power or the means to return Conder to his 
former employment. The only practical remedy available 
to him was to continue working, thus affirming the agree-
ment, and bring an action seeking damages. 
The principles enunciated by Professor McCormick 
as cited above, were followed by this Court in the case 
of Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980): 
The plaintiff in an action for fraud has 
the option to elect to rescind the transaction 
and recover the purchase price or to affirm the 
transaction and recover damages. The choice of 
remedy belongs to the victim of the fraud, and 
cannot be forced upon him. 
See also, Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 304 (Utah 1979), 
where the same principles were set forth and followed. 
The court below held that the Dugan case to be inapplicable 
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without stating its reasons either in making the ruling 
from the bench or in its Partial Summary Judgment. (R527 
632) 
Utah is not alone in recognizing this choice 
of remedies. See, e.g., Rogers v. Crest Motors, Inc., 
516 P.2d 445 (Colo. 1973); Brockway v. Heilman, 58 Cal. 
Rptr.772 (1967). Cf. also, McCormick, supra. In Chester 
v. McDaniel, 504 P.2d 726 (Ore. 1972), that court stated: 
The law is well settled that a defrauded purchaser 
upon discovery of the fraud may elect to rescind 
the contract or may affirm the contract and sue 
for damages. The action for damages is an affirm-
ance or ratification of the contract and a waiver 
of the right to rescind, but in no sense is it 
a waiver of the right to recover all the damages 
caused by the fraud. 
In this case, to require Conder to terminate 
his employment, claiming that it was necessary in order 
to mitigate his damages, is both a denial of the option 
given him under Dugan and other cases cited herein, and 
a misapplication of the avoidable consequenses doctrine. 
Although the Dugan and Mecham cases involved 
purchase agreements, there is no reason why the choice 
of remedies should not also be available in the case of 
a fraudulently induced employment agreement. In Elizaga 
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 487 P.2d 870 (Ore. 
1971), the issue was the measure of damages in an action 
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based upon a fraudulently induced employment agreement 
and the defendant had asked for an instruction that damages 
should be in an amount "which would restore Plaintiff 
to the condition that he was in prior to the fraudulent 
representation." The court rejected the request because 
the plaintiff had not elected to disaffirm the agreement, 
but in fact had affirmed it and was seeking damages. 
Such is the case here. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENSES 
DOES NOT REQUIRE THE VICTIM OF A FRAUDU-
LENTLY INDUCED CONTRACT TO RESCIND 
THE CONTRACT UPON LEARNING OF THE 
FRAUD 
A.L. Williams and MILICO asserted in the 
proceedings before the district court that Conder should 
be "barred from recovering any damages accruing after 
he discovered the alleged falsity of those representations. 
A plaintiff suing in tort is charged with the duty 
to reasonably mitigate his damages." (R655) This was 
based upon the fact that Conder did not terminate his 
employment agreement immediately upon learning of the 
fraud. Counsel for A.L. Williams and iMILICO argued 
that Conder "has a duty to avoid such consequences 
as are avoidable and simply get another job if he wants 
to sell securities and real estate as he claims." 
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(R623-24) He cites three cases in support of this 
argument, none of which do more than set forth the 
doctrince of avoidable consequences. Thompson v. Jacob-
sen, 23 Utah 2d 359, 463 P.2d 801 (1970), is an automobile 
accident case where no facts were set forth in the 
written opinion. Several rules of law were cited with 
approval: ". . .(2) The jury should be left to make 
its best estimate of damage and compensate accordingly 
.(5) That plaintiff has a duty reasonably to mitigate 
damages." The damages awarded by the jury were then 
upheld . 
Jardine v. Brunsyick, supra, was also cited 
but the question of damages was not discussed as the 
Court found an absence of liability on the part of 
the defendant. 
The last case cited, Anchorage Independent 
School District v. Stephens, 370 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1962), 
involves property tax redemption. The property owner, 
who could have redeemed property sold at a tax sale 
for $135.00, waited six months and then asked for $6,000.00 
of alleged damages occurring in the interim. The court 
denied relief because the owner did not take reasonable 
steps to avoid the loss. 
All three cases may well expound sound legal 
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principles, but none are applicable here. The doctrine 
is sound, but it should not be applied to deny Conder 
his selection of remedies. 
The issue might well be raised as a question 
of fact at trial for the jury to determine whether 
Conder did all he could do after affirming the contract 
to mitigate his losses. It might be an appropriate 
issue to raise to determine whether Conder had done 
all he could do to restore himself to the position he 
was in before the contract, had he elected to rescind 
it. It is premature to decide as a matter of law that 
he isnft entitled to go to the jury because the avoidable 
consequences rule required him to rescind the agreement 
and "get another job." 
Even if the doctrine were appropriate here, 
A.L. Williams and MILICO would have to do more than 
argue the point to prevail. In Pratt v. Board of Educ. 
of the Uintah County School Dist., 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 
1977), this Court observed: 
Mitigation of damages is an affirmative 
defense. Although plaintiff is obligated to 
minimize his damages, the burden is upon the 
party whose wrongful act caused the damages 
to prove anything in diminution thereof. 
There is no evidence presented to the court below which 
would justify the contention that Conder1s claim of damage 
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should be diminished for failure to mitigate damages* 
If Conder had quit his job, as has been suggested, it 
may have increased the damages but there is no evidence 
before the court to sustain either position. Although 
the burden of proof was upon A.L. Williams and iMILICO 
to prove anything in diminution of damages, they instead 
attempted to place the burden upon Conder by claiming 
that he had to "mitigate" in order to establish a prima 
facie case. (R622-23) Such a claim is incorrect and gives 
no legitimate basis for granting summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Conder has alleged in his Complaint that 
A.L. Williams and MILICO falsely represented to him that 
they were a full service financial company. In sworn 
answers to Interrogatories, he also stated that A.L. Wil-
liams and MILICO representatives had repeatedly told him 
that they were a company like E.F. Hutton, Merrill Lynch 
and Dean Witter; that they had a securities side of the 
house and a real estate side of the house and that they 
could deal in gold, silver and annuities as well. Mr. 
Conder has made these claims under oath and elicited evi-
dence from A.L. Williams and MILICO by way of answers 
to interrogatories that these claims concerning the nature 
of A.L. Williams and MILICO were false, and were known 
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by the claimants to be false, Mr. Conder claims to have 
relied upon these false representations and claims to 
have been damaged thereby. The above is further supported 
by affidavits submitted by him in response to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
In spite of the fact that A.L. Williams and 
MILICO had ample opportunity to do so, they have chosen 
to present no evidence contradicting any of the above. 
In their Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting Memo-
randum, no affidavits were used to support any contention 
that Mr. Conderfs claims were false and that there were 
no genuine issues of material fact, thus justifying Summary 
Judgment. Mr. Conder contends that there are numerous 
such issues, although he only has defendants1 Answer to 
his Complaint to support that contention, because he finds 
nothing in his or defendants' discovery to justify their 
position. 
The only logical conclusion from the above is 
that A.L. Williams and MILICO did not challenge the various 
claims concerning fraudulent misrepresentations by their 
representatives because they accepted the fact that the 
misrepresentations had, in fact, been made. Therefore, 
they proceeded to contend that Mr. Conder was precluded 
from pursuing his claims as a matter of law because, (1) 
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the misrepresentations did not relate to presently existing 
material facts, but to future promises, predictions or 
conjectures; (2) Conder unreasonably relied upon the misrep-
resentations; and (3) he should have quit his job to miti-
gate his damages. At the risk of being redundant, it 
should again be pointed out that no evidence was submitted 
to support the legal challenge to the lawsuit. More impor-
tantly, Conder contends that said challenge is insufficient 
for the reasons set forth in his Statement of Law. 
Mr. Conder, the plaintiff and appellant in this 
case, respectfully requests that this Court set aside 
the Partial Summary Judgment entered by the court below 
and remand the case for trial, for the reasons and on 
the grounds set forth herein. 
DATED this 11th day of January, 1985. 
Dennis L. Wright 
Attorney for Appellai 
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